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Abstract 
The notion of dark networks has recently received attention in the literature on policy 
network analysis. Dark networks are defined as illegal and covert, in contrast to bright 
networks which are legal and overt. In this article, we suggest a third category – grey 
networks – which are characterised by their use of secrecy and concealment despite their 
ostensibly legal status. These networks are subject to contradictory imperatives. They 
employ methods that cannot be openly acknowledged within the larger legal and social 
framework in which they function. In this article, we illustrate this concept through an 
interview-based study of Australia’s immigration detention network. This network enacts a 
deterrence policy which has been widely condemned as breaching Australia’s obligations 
under international law. At the same time, it is required to maintain a façade of lawfulness 
and respect for human rights. 
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Grey Networks: The Contradictory Dimensions of Australia’s Immigration Detention 
System 
 
‘The gatekeeper gives him a stool and allows him to sit down at the side in front of the 
gate. There he sits for days and years. He makes many attempts to be let in, and he 
wears the gatekeeper out with his requests. The gatekeeper often interrogates him 
briefly, questioning him about his homeland and many other things, but they are 
indifferent questions, the kind great men put, and at the end he always tells him once 
more that he cannot let him inside yet. The man, who has equipped himself with many 
things for his journey, spends everything, no matter how valuable, to win over the 
gatekeeper. The latter takes it all but, as he does so, says, “I am taking this only so that 
you do not think you have failed to do anything.”’  
(Kafka, 1915: 5)  
 
Introduction 
‘Policy network analysis’ is an umbrella term for a large and fragmented literature, 
beginning in the early 1980s. According to Rhodes, the term ‘policy network analysis’ has 
been used in three main ways within this scholarship, ‘as a description of governments at 
work, as a theory for analysing government policy making, and as a prescription for 
reforming public management’ (Rhodes, 2008: 426). In these literatures, policy networks are 
typically characterised as assemblages of nodes, linkages and relationships, both formal and 
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informal, between governmental agencies and other organisations such as business groups, 
interest groups and civil society associations (Rhodes, 2008: 426). In general, policy network 
analysis has focused on collaborative networks which are ‘seen as appropriate devices to 
tackle public management problems and to successfully coordinate political, social, and 
economic action’ (Raab and Milward, 2003: 413). 
We take as our starting point a problem delineated by Milward and Raab (2006); in a series 
of papers, Raab and Milward have sought to develop an account of ‘dark networks’. This 
research is concerned with networks as problems rather than networks as means of 
addressing social needs. As the authors note, ‘one of the basic features of research on 
networks, which repeatedly appears in almost all studies, is the statement that networks are 
often the only governance form that is able to deal with today's complex problems’ (2003: 
418). In exploring this function, however, this literature has tended to overlook what Raab 
and Milward characterise as the ‘darker’ side of networks, primarily the role of networks in 
organised crime and terrorism. They thus introduce a distinction between ‘dark’ and ‘bright’ 
networks, that is, between systems of illicit association that are characterised by their 
secretive nature, and the more commonly studied legal networks that permeate all of 
society.  
Bright and dark networks are delineated along two axes: legal/illegal and overt/covert (Raab 
and Milward, 2003: 413).  The authors acknowledge that the distinction is not clear cut, and 
that dark and bright networks can come together in a ‘grey zone’, for example in the 
political arm of a terrorist organisation (such as Sinn Fein and the IRA) (Milward and Raab, 
2006: 334). In this paper, we draw attention to a kind of network which cannot be 
straightforwardly located on these axes and which thus highlights a limitation of this 
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taxonomic framework. Essentially, our point is that the degree of legality or transparency of 
a network is sometimes a contested question. For Milward and Raab, legality ‘refers to the 
laws of the state, any state’ (Milward and Raab, 2006: 334). Legality, in their framework, is 
relativised to a specified jurisdiction. For example, they describe networks organised by the 
Third Reich as ‘bright’ because they were legal under that regime. However, networks often 
operate across jurisdictions and in contested legal spaces where different sources of law 
and legal authority come into conflict. Most importantly for this article – domestic law and 
policy may come into conflict with a state’s obligations under international law.  
Networks have been characterised as overt or covert based primarily on whether the nodes 
in the network are readily visible, or whether the network is hidden and can only be 
mapped with considerable investigative effort. However, it is possible for a network to be 
transparent in one sense and opaque in another. The network that we are concerned with 
in this paper is overt in that it is an instrument of government policy whose nodes and 
connections are visible. Nonetheless, aspects of the operation and function of this network 
are, by design, opaque. The term ‘grey networks’ in this paper is intended to describe 
networks that appear to have ambiguous properties with respect to both lawfulness and 
transparency.   
What we are calling ‘grey networks’ are networks that have to manage internal 
contradictions. They occupy a legal grey zone in that they may be legal under domestic law 
but illegal under international law, or they may abrogate rights which are recognised 
elsewhere in the legal system. Grey networks also have a Janus-faced character, in that they 
present as operating within legal and social norms, according to fair procedures, while at 
the same time enabling activities that must be officially disavowed. Grey networks may 
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develop in contexts where an institutional framework is placed under discordant pressures 
and where it is, for example, subject to political demands that are not straightforwardly 
realisable within the overarching legal and social framework.  
While we would argue that this phenomenon can be observed in a number of contexts, this 
article is specifically concerned with Australia’s immigration detention network.i It is based 
on an empirical study of the experiences of volunteer visitors to detention facilities. Raab 
and Milward have pointed out that the concept of a ‘network’ is used in a variety of ways 
within the social sciences literature (2003: 417). For the purposes of this discussion, the 
detention network is understood as the web of individuals and organisations who make and 
enact decisions affecting asylum seekers held in Australia’s immigration detention facilities. 
As this article will demonstrate, such decisions concern not only the processing of the 
asylum seekers’ refugee claims, but also the control and management of their daily lives.   
The mandatory detention of unauthorised maritime arrivals has been a cornerstone of 
Australia’s immigration policy since 1992 (Phillips and Spinks, 2013: 5). In its most recent 
incarnation, this policy has seen asylum seekers detained and processed offshore on Manus 
Island or Nauru, but a system of prison-like facilities continues to operate on the Australian 
mainland. It is these facilities and their governance that are the focus of this paper.  Unlike 
the offshore facilities, Australia’s onshore detention facilities fall entirely under the 
jurisdiction of Australian courts. The enactment of electorally-popular immigration policies 
such as mandatory detention thus places contradictory pressures on the system. On one 
hand, the network is answerable to the policy goal of deterring asylum seekers. On the 
other hand, the pursuit of these goals threatens to violate long-established norms of due 
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process, owed to any person on Australian soil, as well as breaching Australia’s obligations 
under international law.  
Australia’s processing of asylum claims has been notoriously slow, and both the on- and 
offshore facilities have been plagued with cases of neglect, mistreatment and abuse. If it is 
understood as a ‘bright’ or conventional network, much of what happens within Australia’s 
detention system can only be attributed to mismanagement, inefficiency and/or structural 
flaws. While we certainly would not deny that such failings exist, there is a useful 
explanatory perspective that is not available under the bright network assumption. A more 
satisfactory explanation of this apparent dysfunction needs to pay attention to the 
discordant imperatives that this system is answerable to.  
When fieldwork for this study was conducted, nine onshore immigration detention facilities 
were operational in Australia. These facilities were Maribyrnong Immigration Detention 
Centre (IDC),ii Villawood IDC, Christmas Island IDC, Yongah Hill IDC, Perth IDC, Brisbane 
Immigration Transit Accommodation (ITA), Melbourne ITA, Adelaide ITA, and Wickham 
Point Alternative Place of Detention (APOD)iii. The testimonial evidence in this paper derives 
from in-depth, semi-structured, face-to-face interviews, conducted in 2015 and 2016 with 
32 visitors to these facilities. Collectively, the participants in this study were visitors at all of 
the above detention facilities, with the exception of Adelaide ITA. Interviews were 
conducted by Peterie as part of a larger study concerning the experiences of volunteers who 
support asylum seekers in Australia. The testimonial nature of this dataset is important 
because policy documentation and press releases conceal the lived reality of daily practice 
within these facilities. These testimonies also reveal the extent to which opacity and 
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confusion are operational principles that serve to make the system unnavigable for those 
subject to its authority.  
This paper begins with a discussion of the legal tensions that surround Australia’s treatment 
of unauthorised maritime arrivals. It examines the extraordinary statutory measures that 
have been taken to make policies legal under domestic law. The paper then turns to 
consider the means by which the reality of Australia’s mandatory detention policy is made 
simultaneously visible and deniable, and examines the discursive strategies that help to 
make that possible. A deterrence policy requires violence, but that violence must also be 
rendered legally and socially palatable. The final section of this paper examines the use of 
‘soft violence’ within the system, arguing that control, arbitrariness and opacity can achieve 
torture-like effects while maintaining a façade of humaneness. These ambiguities, we argue, 
should not be understood as problems to be resolved. A grey network is not a dysfunctional 
bright network. Rather, a grey network presents as a bright network, but performs functions 
that would not be sustainable in a straightforwardly law-abiding and transparent system.  
 
The Tension between Domestic and International Law  
The onshore detention facilities exist to realise Australia’s policy of mandatory detention. As 
indicated above, the system consists of ten facilities. The operation of these facilities has 
been outsourced to a private contractor, SERCO, who manages the centres on behalf of the 
Department of Immigration and Border Protection.  
The United Nations has found that Australia’s policies of mandatory detention and offshore 
processing violate its obligations under international law (20 August 2013a, 20 August 
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2013b). The Australian Human Rights Commission has made a similar claim, particularly with 
regard to children in detention (2014). In some countries, international laws are 
automatically incorporated into the domestic legal system. In Australia, however, this is not 
the case. International laws cannot be enforced by Australian courts unless these laws have 
been incorporated into domestic laws. As such, policies that are consistent with Australian 
law can withstand legal challenge, even when these laws constitute clear violations of 
Australia’s international human rights obligations.  
This feature of Australian law has been exploited in order to deny asylum seekers the legal 
rights that Australia has committed to upholding. There are two mechanisms of particular 
note here. First, offshore processing – a policy which sees asylum seekers processed outside 
the jurisdiction of Australia’s courts – has been introduced. Second, successive governments 
have passed laws which ensure that treaty obligations are not enforceable by Australian 
courts. By stripping refugee protections from domestic law, the government has 
circumscribed asylum seekers’ rights. Far from enshrining Australia’s commitment to abide 
by The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (‘the Refugee Convention’), the 
Australian government has removed all references to the Refugee Convention from the 
Migration Act 1958 (McAdam, 3 December 2014).  
Furthermore, the government has often legislated to bolster the legal standing of its policies 
when challenges have been mounted (McAdam and Chong, 2014: 172-173). For example, in 
June 2015 the government introduced emergency legislation which was allegedly designed 
to head-off a challenge to the legality of Australia’s offshore detention system (Conifer and 
Doran, 24 June 2015). Faced with questions about the timing of the Bill, Attorney-General 
Brandis disingenuously claimed that the government was not acting to protect itself, and 
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that Australia’s offshore processing arrangements had always been lawful. “The legal advice 
to the Government and to the previous Labor government was that the scheme was within 
the law" (Brandis in Conifer and Doran, 24 June 2015). More importantly, however, this 
defence trades on a narrow and technical conception of lawfulness, which evades 
disquestions about respect for human dignity and fundamental rights. It should also be 
noted that despite legislative efforts to make Australia’s asylum policies lawful, issues of 
domestic lawfulness remain. This was seen in 2017 when the government settled a 
compensation claim for AU$70 million. The complainants – a group of current and former 
detainees – had claimed damages for “consequences arising out of [their] transfer and 
subsequent confinement […] at Manus Island” (Macaulay, 2017).  
With respect to international law, Australia has repeatedly failed to meet its obligations as a 
signatory to the Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of 
Refugees. Human rights experts around the world have condemned Australia’s asylum 
seeker policies as a violation of these treaties, as well as a breach of several other 
international agreements. The Refugee Convention formally recognises that the very nature 
of the refugee experience means that it is often impossible for forced migrants to secure 
passports and visas as they flee persecution (Phillips, 2011: 2-3). The cornerstone of 
Australia’s asylum seeker policy, however, is indefinite mandatory detention. This policy 
sees all maritime asylum seekers who arrive in Australia without prior authorisation placed 
in immigration detention until their asylum claims have been determined, or until the 
Minister has granted them permission to reside in the community. This policy applies only to 
‘illegal’ (unauthorised) arrivals; those who arrive with valid documentation and go on to 
claim asylum are not subject to mandatory detention (Phillips and Spinks, 2013: 1-2).  
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Australia’s detention policy has also been seen as a breach of article 9 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). This article provides that ‘[n]o one shall be 
subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention’ (UN General Assembly, 1966). Australia’s 
detention regime has been described as ‘arbitrary’. The Australian Human Rights 
Commission acknowledges that short-term detention may be necessary in some 
circumstances, but notes that ‘in order to avoid detention being arbitrary, there must be an 
individual assessment of the necessity of detention for each person, taking into 
consideration their individual circumstances’ (1 January 2014). The blanket and default 
application of Australia’s detention policy renders it arbitrary. 
In addition to these concerns, the conditions in which Australia holds asylum seekers have 
been widely denounced (Phillips and Spinks, 2013). The United National Human Rights 
Committee (20 August 2013a, 20 August 2013b) and the Australian Human Rights 
Commission (2013) have both suggested that in some circumstances Australia’s detention 
regime constitutes ‘cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment’, placing it in violation of article 
10 of the ICCPR. At times centres have been overcrowded, and housing arrangements 
(including the accommodation of asylum seekers with convicted criminals, or young children 
with mentally ill adults) have raised concern. Australia’s offshore processing facilities have 
received particular criticism. Refugees and whistle blowers have described horrific 
conditions and endemic levels of physical and sexual violence (Nethery and Holman, 2016, 
Hoang and Gleeson, 10 August 2016), including incidents involving children. Within the 
Nauru Files (a cache of 2,116 leaked incident reports from Australia’s processing centre on 
Nauru), there were seven reports of sexual assaults involving children, 59 reports of assault 
on children and 30 reports of self-harm involving children (Farrell et al., 10 August 2016). 
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For many, the most concerning aspect of Australia’s detention regime is the fact that 
Australia’s mandatory detention policy also applies to minors. A 2014 Australian Human 
Rights Commission Inquiry into Children in Immigration Detention found that prolonged 
detention had ‘[profound] negative impacts on the mental and emotional health and 
development of children’, with 34 percent of detained children suffering from serious 
mental health disorders (29). The Commission also expressed concern that children in 
detention were regularly exposed to physical danger. The Commission was particularly 
condemnatory regarding the detention of children in offshore facilities, where physical and 
sexual violence are rife.iv The Convention on the Rights of the Child enshrines the 
overarching legal principle that ‘in any actions concerning children, the best interests of the 
child shall be a primary consideration’ (McAdam and Chong, 2014: 101, see also Human 
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, April 2004). The application of Australia’s 
mandatory detention policy to children violates this principle. 
It is clear from this chorus of indictment that Australia is pursuing a policy that breaches its 
obligations under international law. Nevertheless, the legal manoeuvres outlined earlier 
have rendered these laws domestically unenforceable. What is striking here is the effort to 
maintain the appearance of respect for international law and human rights. Australia has 
responded to these charges by insisting that its policies do comply with its legal obligations, 
and claiming that the issue reduces to a question of difference in interpretation (see, for 
example, Conifer and Doran, 24 June 2015). If the international lawfulness of Australia’s 
detention practices was not in question, however, it would be difficult to explain the veil of 
secrecy that covers the system. Staff at offshore processing centres have been required to 
sign non-disclosure agreements, and journalists and human rights organisations are 
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routinely denied access (Fleay, 2015, Nethery and Holman, 2016). Although the offshore 
facilities are more isolated than the onshore network, there is significantly less formal 
oversight within the onshore network than within Australia’s prison system (Briskman et al., 
2008: 343). Restrictions on media access and the obstacles faced by external visitors suggest 
the intention to make these centres, as far as possible, closed institutions. Many scholars 
have highlighted the centrality of secrecy and inaccessibility to Australia’s detention 
strategy, noting that asylum seekers are often kept ‘out of sight, out of mind’. As Fleay 
notes, ‘[t]here is limited independent monitoring of these facilities by formal state and non-
state bodies. There are also few civil society groups and individuals with the capacity to visit 
and provide a monitoring role’ (2015: 22). 
 
Discursive Manoeuvres  
In the last two decades, Australia has seen the bipartisan endorsement of policies explicitly 
intended to deter asylum seekers from seeking protection in Australia. These escalating 
measures and the dehumanising discourses that have accompanied them respond to the 
political reality that Australian politicians are rewarded at the polls for ‘tough’ asylum 
policies. The 2001 election is often described as a turning point in Australia’s treatment of 
asylum seekers (see, for example, Suhnan et al., 2012: 80). The conservative government – 
led by Prime Minister John Howard – entered the campaign trailing in the polls but went on 
to win a decisive victory. Howard exploited public fears regarding terrorism and ‘Islamic 
extremism’ in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks in the US, and projected 
these fears onto maritime asylum seekers (Poynting et al., 2004, Marr and Wilkinson, 2003, 
Poynting and Noble, 2003, Devetak, 2007). Howard’s stance was cast as a display of national 
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strength. This successful electoral strategy provided a template for subsequent 
governments, and began what has been widely described as a ‘race to the bottom’ on the 
treatment of boat arrivals. While public antipathy to asylum seekers has been identified as a 
decisive electoral issue (McMaster, 2002: 280), it is manifestly clear that these policy 
objectives are in tension with Australia’s self-understanding as a ‘generous’ country with an 
exemplary record of respect for human rights.  
Discourse analysts have drawn attention to a number of key narratives which have come to 
structure Australia’s asylum seeker debate and justify the government’s policies. These 
narratives include stories about the threat that asylum seekers pose to Australian values 
(Gale, 2004, Gelber, 2003, Every and Augoustinos, 2007, Randell-Moon, 2006, Dunn et al., 
2007); to the maintenance of law, order and domestic security (McCulloch, 2004, Poynting 
et al., 2004, Brookes, 2010); and to national resources (Columbus, 2002, Green, 2003). 
While research confirms that these messages resonate with the electorate (McKay et al., 
2011), Australians have also expressed concern regarding the human costs of deterrence. As 
such, governments have increasingly employed humanitarian language to frame their 
policies, suggesting that hardline deterrence policies are ‘compassionate’ (in that they 
purportedly save lives at sea and curb people-smuggling) and ‘fair’ (in that they ensure 
maritime asylum seekers derive no advantage from ‘jumping the queue’) (Peterie 2017; see 
also Dauvernge, 2015). These discursive strategies present deterrence policies as 
compatible with Australia’s self-image as a decent and law-abiding country. 
In reality, however, the realisation of these policies involves attempting to repel people who 
are already at the limit of human desperation. As a consequence, deterrence necessarily 
requires harsh and draconian measures. The political effectiveness of deterrence thus 
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depends on an acute form of bad faith in the popular discourse. While this tension can be 
sidestepped at the level of campaign slogans, its practical consequences impose 
contradictory demands on the detention network itself. The issue here is that the detention 
system is required to function as an instrument of deterrence. It has to be seen by both the 
voting public and the would-be asylum seeker as harsh and punitive. At the same time, 
however, asylum seekers in Australia’s onshore system are rights-bearers who have 
committed no crime and whose treatment is governed by legal norms. Notwithstanding the 
legislative erosion of rights for onshore asylum seekers, those who are processed within the 
onshore system have different prospects to those who have been sent offshore. 
 
Soft Violence  
To negotiate the contradiction between Australia’s deterrence policy and its international 
obligations, the legal and discursive strategies described above require the supplement of 
an additional set of techniques at the institutional level. These techniques are applied to 
detainees whose legal claims are already in process within the onshore network, for the 
purpose of realising Australia’s deterrence policy while retaining the appearance of due 
process. We refer to these techniques collectively as ‘soft violence’. ‘Soft’ here does not 
mean gentle. Rather it refers to a means of breaking people which operates at a 
psychological level. Since the 1971 Stanford Prison Experiment (Zimbardo, 2007), it has been 
understood that people can be psychologically broken through techniques of 
dehumanisation and disempowerment. Scholars have drawn attention to the centrality of 
‘deprivations’ and ‘frustrations’ to the incarceration experience, noting that these systems 
of institutional disempowerment in fact constitute a ‘threat to the life goals of the 
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individual, to his defensive system, to his self-esteem, or to his feelings of security’ (Maslow 
in Skyes, 1958). For scholars in this tradition the psychological pain of institutionalisation 
and incarceration is best understood as non-accidental (Goffman, 1961, Brookes, 2001, 
Pizarro and Stenius, 2004, DeVeaux, 2013, Foucault, 1995 [1975]). The accounts presented 
in the interviews on which this article draws point to three main operational principles – 
control, arbitrariness and opacity – that can be interpreted as modes of soft violence. These 
principles, we argue, should also be seen as non-accidental.  
Soft violence is a means by which the detention system fulfils its contradictory imperatives. 
It perpetrates an effective deterrent violence in a manner which maintains at least a 
superficial respect for law, due-process and human rights norms. Opacity is a strategy 
deployed both outside and within the system. On one hand, the network hides abuses from 
public view.  On the other, opacity renders even the ordinary details of daily live 
unpredictable. This lack of transparency is a powerful means for breaking people without 
appearing to break the law.  
 
Control 
The onshore network is an all-encompassing system. Control is exercised over not just the 
physical movements of asylum seekers in time and space, but also over the smallest choices 
of everyday life. It is significant, given the detainees are not criminals, that the forms of 
control that we see in detention go far beyond that which is necessary to fulfil their 
custodial function. 
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The most obvious form of control that asylum seekers are subjected to is restrictions on 
their movements. What detention means, in practice, is that almost all aspects of an asylum 
seeker’s life take place within the closed confines of a detention facility. As one interviewee 
explained, 
‘These people that you visited last week, they have not moved. They've gone to their 
room to the community area to maybe the sporting oval to the community area back 
to their room to the internet area but they haven't moved outside a space of 100 
square metres of whatever it is’.  
Within the facilities themselves, asylum seekers’ movements are also restricted. One 
interviewee noted that the asylum seekers were not permitted to use the same bathroom 
as their visitors. Another described being rebuked when she tried to take a child to look at 
the garden. 
‘I actually tried to take one of the little kids in there to walk around and have a look 
at the flowers, and one of the guards said 'you're not allowed in there' […] I suppose 
I just thought why do we deprive people of something so basic as having your toes in 
the grass and bending down and picking a petunia and looking at the colours on it? 
And feeling, you know, touching stuff? Whereas back in there all that they could 
touch were hard things – like the climbing frame and the slippery slide’.  
When asylum seekers are permitted to leave detention facilities – for example, when they 
need medical attention – they are accompanied by security personnel and sometimes 
handcuffed. One interviewee noted that his friend had refused to wear handcuffs during a 
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trip to the doctor because he did not wish to be perceived as a criminal. The medical 
appointment was subsequently cancelled.  
Interviewees also noted that institutional life saw asylum seekers denied agency over the 
most basic areas of their lives. This reality was particularly pronounced for asylum seekers 
who had children. As one interviewee reflected, detained parents could not choose where 
their children lived or went to school. They could not buy their clothes, attend their parent-
teacher interviews, or decide what they ate.  
‘All those things that you take for granted when you've got freedom are not there for 
those parents. That their lives are – their everyday life is dictated. Choosing what 
their kids can take to school for lunch. They sound like really silly things but they're 
the things that you can control as a parent and those mums and dads can't do that.’ 
Being unable to fulfil a parent’s responsibilities towards their children – through, for 
example, the provision of food and clothing – effects an ongoing humiliation and 
infantilisation. When combined with the negative impacts of detention-related mental 
health deterioration on parenting and parent-child bonding, these harms are compounded.   
The psychological effect of denying asylum seekers even the most mundane acts of choice 
and decision undermines their sense of agency. The erosion of agential capacities leads to 
what is termed, in the psychological literature, ‘learned helplessness’.  
‘Learned helplessness, the failure to escape shock induced by uncontrollable 
aversive events, was discovered half a century ago. Seligman and Maier (1967) 
theorized that animals learned that outcomes were independent of their 
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responses—that nothing they did mattered—and that this learning undermined 
trying to escape’. (Maier and Seligman, 2016: 349) 
While contemporary neuroscientific research suggests that the theory of learned 
helplessness ‘got it backward’ – that is, that passivity is not learned but ‘the default, 
unlearned response to prolonged aversive events’ (Maier and Seligman, 2016: 349) – 
Seligman and Maier’s core insight regarding the relationships between prolonged and 
uncontrollable negative stimulation and helplessness has endured. Behavioural research has 
repeatedly demonstrated that when individuals are simultaneously exposed to stressors and 
denied control over their circumstances, passivity and anxiety will result. This effect can be 
prevented by giving individuals control (Maier and Seligman, 2016: 361). 
The message continuously reiterated and reinforced by techniques of control in immigration 
detention facilities is that the detainee is powerless. If a person cannot exercise choice in 
inconsequential matters, then a fortiori they lack agency with respect to their asylum claim. 
The point of control mechanisms that penetrate down to minute details of daily life is to 
manufacture passivity and despair. Whether this response is learned or innate, it is 
nonetheless a predictable result of this technology of control.  
We argued above that a grey network is a network that is subject to internal contradictions. 
We noted that grey networks present as operating within legal and social norms, but pursue 
outcomes that must be officially disavowed. The rules and prohibitions described here are a 
powerful technique that disempower detainees, producing psychological distress without 
having to make that intention explicit.  
 
20 of 31 
 
Arbitrariness 
Arbitrariness functions to assert a radical asymmetry of power. Arbitrariness here refers to 
the permanent possibility of a decision that is both sudden and incontestable. Shifting and 
unpredictable prohibitions and reinterpretations of rules demonstrate to the asylum 
seekers the extent of their powerlessness. A recurring theme in the interviews concerned 
arbitrariness in the small details of institutional life, for example, in the management of 
leisure activities. One interviewee described her confusion when, during her first visit to a 
detention facility, she saw Muslim adult asylum seekers colouring in what she described as 
‘pre-school level’ pictures of Easter bunnies and Easter eggs.  
‘I couldn't understand – why are they doing it? Why are they cooperating? I just said 
to [one asylum seeker], 'do you like colouring in?' you know. And she said 'no'. And I 
said 'oh, why are you doing it then?' And then she explained that it was for the 
points that they get […] So they do an activity for half an hour they get two points. So 
with three or six points they can buy some shampoo or nicer soap or whatever, 
chocolate. So that's why they do it, to get the points. […] I just thought 'this is really 
demeaning. This is really demeaning. These grown adult people doing anything just 
to get a few points.’ 
Several weeks later, with no notice or explanation, all colouring in at the centre was banned. 
Another interviewee explained that his asylum seeker friend had derived great joy from 
occasional trips out of detention to visit the beach. During these supervised excursions, the 
asylum seeker would chat with the locals and enjoy a few moments of ‘normality’ in the 
open air. Without notice or explanation, these trips were cancelled. As one interviewee 
noted,  
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‘I don't know if it is necessarily the government or SERCO doing it to create 
hopelessness, but they certainly don't do anything to give sense of reason. […] 
People start to create their own reasons as to why it's happening, and it happens a 
lot. And that's the first conclusion they'll jump to, that they're doing it to 
disadvantage them or to damage them. To make them not feel good.’ 
Interviewees thus reported that detainees interpret the system’s capriciousness as a 
deliberate cruelty.  
Within Australia’s detention regime, arbitrariness is discernible in the small details of 
institutional life, but it is perhaps communicated most dramatically in forced relocations. It 
is common for asylum seekers to be moved from one detention facility to another. Often 
asylum seekers are moved to other facilities within the onshore network; for those who had 
previously been transferred from offshore to onshore detention (usually for medical 
attention), these relocations may also involve being transferred to Manus Island or Nauru. 
When a detainee is moved from one centre to another this removal typically happens with 
little warning or explanation, often at night. Other asylum seekers see their friends dragged 
away but may not be told where they are being taken or why. These scenes constantly 
remind detainees of the Damoclean sword under which they live.  
Another form of arbitrariness, crucial to this dispiriting effect, is arbitrariness with respect to 
time. Here the network produces a kind of stasis in which a case is in process but the asylum 
seeker is given no timeline for when a decision will be reached. One asylum seeker told her 
visitor, ‘every day we see our case manager, and every day they tell us ‘not today’, and we 
don't know more’; another described her elderly mother telling her ‘we’re going to die 
here’. In January 2017, the average number of days that detainees spent in Australia’s 
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onshore detention facilities was 493, a number that has been steadily rising since 2013 
(RCOA, 1 March 2017). A 2016 report by the Commonwealth Ombudsman also noted that 
42 people had been in detention for five years or more, with no foreseeable possibility of 
release (Commonwealth and Immigration Ombudsman, July 2016). 
Unlike a prisoner serving a fixed sentence, the detainee is unable to make any plans for a 
future that may not eventuate. What is particularly cruel about this situation is that even 
the ordinary strategies by which people maintain hope are rendered untenable. As one 
interviewee, a youth worker, explained, youth work usually involves working with young 
people to ‘build hopes and dreams’. Within detention environments, however, any 
aspirations are purely hypothetical. The young asylum seekers that this interviewee visited 
were thus unable to build, commit to or sustain themselves with any real goals because 
their futures were so uncertain.  
We argue that this regime of unstable rules and arbitrary practices should be understood 
primarily in terms of its psychological function, which is to amplify the sense of helplessness 
that the detainees experience. The individual actions required by this technique of ‘a 
thousand cuts’ can be represented as largely innocuous, insulating individual actors from 
moral and legal responsibility for the aggregate effects achieved by the network as a whole.  
 
Opacity  
A third theme in these testimonies concerns the opaque way in which power is exercised 
within the detention facilities. Interviewees emphasised the complex nature of the 
bureaucratic processes that the asylum seekers were required to go through, noting that 
23 of 31 
 
many detainees had minimal understanding of the legal and administrative mechanisms 
that governed their detention. One interviewee recalled asking the asylum seeker he visited, 
whose protection claim had just been rejected for the third time, ‘do they ever tell you why 
you’re rejected?’ The man answered, ‘oh, they give me a bit of paper. I don’t understand it.’ 
Another described lodging freedom of information requests so that the detainees she 
visited would have access to their own files. While several interviewees emphasised that 
language barriers made these processes particularly opaque for asylum seekers, others 
suggested that even legal experts found the system confounding.  
‘I was sitting in a court case […] where judges who were experts on administration 
but not on immigration were trying to get their head around how this whole thing 
worked and why the delays […] And at one stage the presiding judge said “I think I’m 
in Alice in Wonderland”. And we all just laughed.’ 
In a bright network, opacity is regarded as problematic. It can be a cause of inefficiency and 
dysfunction. Ideally, the hierarchical organisation and lines of responsibility are transparent, 
such that sites of decision and the nodes subject to those decisions are visible in the 
network structure. By contrast, in dark networks opacity can be functional. For example, the 
cellular structure of a criminal or terrorist organisation means that when members of one 
cell are captured, their lack of knowledge regarding other cells protects the larger network 
from attack. In grey networks, such as the detention network described here, opacity is also 
functional, but in a different way. Opacity here means the obfuscation of procedures and 
decisional hierarchies in ways that make it difficult to act. It serves to paralyse by rendering 
the operations of the network uninterpretable and non-negotiable to both detainees and 
those who would help them. The problem of making a request or complaint, or of even 
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accessing information about one’s own asylum claim, is multiplied by the difficulty of finding 
out how to do these things.  
Opacity also enables plausible deniability in that a policy can be implemented without being 
officially acknowledged. In this context, the outsourcing of operations is a method of 
increasing opacity in the network. As noted, the running of all detention centres in Australia 
has been contracted to a private company. This enables the classification of operational 
information as ‘commercial in confidence’. Similarly, employees of a private contractor can 
be more easily made subject to confidentiality and non-disclosure agreements. Outsourcing 
creates another layer of separation between government and the daily operation of 
detention facilities. When detainees suffer serious harm in detention facilities, blame can be 
diverted away from the government to the contractor and its employees. Furthermore, as 
McPhail, Ochoki Nyamori and Taylor have pointed out, ‘head contractors are allowed to 
sub-contract out the work, which creates huge gaps in accountability. It is unclear who will 
be held accountable in the event that one of the subcontractors fails to discharge their part 
of the contractual obligations’ (2016, 962).  
This opacity also functions to protect the network from challenges and to make it difficult 
for detainees or their representatives to assert their rights. Within detention centres, 
decisions are often delivered without explanation or attribution to an authority. It is unclear 
which rules originate with site personnel and which demands devolve from higher levels of 
management, either within SERCO or in the government. Protests, complaints and requests 
for reconsideration are short circuited by the difficulty of even knowing where to address an 
effective challenge. Those who execute decisions are also able to represent themselves as 
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‘just following orders’ and as having no more understanding of the justification of these 
orders as those subject to them. 
 
Conclusion  
Australia imagines itself to be a liberal democracy and a good international citizen, with 
stable institutions enshrining principles of fairness and equality. In the last two decades, 
both of Australia’s major political parties have promised to stem the flow of unauthorised 
boat arrivals requesting asylum. The realisation of these policies cannot be and has not been 
achieved without inflicting damage on the rule of law and Australia’s international standing. 
The implementation of Australia’s deterrence policies requires, in practice, the deployment 
of techniques calculated to produce helplessness and desperation, and thus to break 
people. This institutionalised cruelty must be visible to the public who voted to ‘stop the 
boats’. At the same time, however, these measures and procedures must be undertaken in 
such a way as to maintain a façade of lawfulness and respect for human rights.  
What we have called a grey network is a network that is subject to contradictions of this 
type. Grey networks implement methods that cannot be fully or officially acknowledged 
within the legal and institutional structure in which they operate. Imprisonment, oppressive 
controls, arbitrariness, endless delay, and the dangerous hothouse effects of closed 
institutions are not techniques that can be openly acknowledged. As MacBeth, in bad faith, 
wills the hand to do what the eye fears, so too does Australia’s detention network allow 
Australia to disavow the cruelty that its asylum policies demand.  
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One contribution of this article, we hope, is to demonstrate the limitation of the dark/bright 
network taxonomy by demonstrating that networks can occupy ambiguous and contested 
spaces with respect to both legality and transparency. The distinction between bright and 
dark networks connects brightness with legality and darkness with illegality. A grey network, 
in our metaphor, is one subject to contradictory imperatives. A grey network is a network 
that occupies, and to an extent creates, a zone of legal ambiguity. It enables policies that are 
at odds with other legal obligations and institutional norms. At the level of representation, 
the grey network maintains the possibility of paying lip service to legal principles and ideals 
while simultaneously skirting these constraints. At the level of operations, it both realises 
and conceals the means necessary to achieve its policy goals. The grey network 
manufactures a zone of inaccessibility. It aims to place its subjects’ rights beyond their own 
reach.   
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i Not all detainees in Australian detention facilities are asylum seekers, and not all asylum seekers are in closed 
detention. The primary focus of this article, however, is the detention of asylum seekers.  
ii Closure of this facility is immanent. 
iii This facility was closed in November 2016. 
iv ‘The Commission has serious concerns that the conditions in which children are detained on Nauru are in 
breach of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, articles 19(1), 20(1), 24(1), 27(1), 27(3), 28, 31 and:  
16(1): No child shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his or her privacy, family, home or 
correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his or her honour and reputation.  
34: States Parties undertake to protect the child from all forms of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse.  
37(a): No child shall be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
Neither capital punishment nor life imprisonment without possibility of release shall be imposed for offences 
committed by persons below eighteen years of age’ (AHRC, 2014). 
 
